An annotation is a brief summary or description (usually 100 to 200 words) of a publication (article, book, web site, movie, etc.). Its purpose is to give the potential reader/viewer/listener an accurate idea of the contents of the publication so that the reader can judge whether the publication is appropriate to the reader’s interests. Note that the reader can be yourself: keeping an annotated list of sources you have consulted can help you later in your research when you are trying to remember what you read where.
An annotated bibliography is a list of publications on a topic with an annotation describing each item in the list. The list can be ordered alphabetically, or grouped thematically.
Annotations can be descriptive or evaluative:
In addition to the complete bibliographical information (author, title, publisher and date, etc), an entry in an annotated bibliography should include at least some of the following:
Foss, J. E. 1989. On the logic of what it is like to be a conscious subject. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67:305-320.
A Super Neuroscientist will know how we describe and think about experience, so will know as much as a Super Sympathist. One doesn't have to imagine to know what it's like. With remarks on bat experience.
[Note: this annotation presumes a familiarity with the subject. The terms "Super Neuroscientist" and "Super Sympathist" are unexplained, and it is assumed that the reader will know what they mean. And the note "With remarks on bat experience" is assumed to trigger a recognition of Thomas Nagel's famous article (well, famous in philosophy circles, anyway) "What is it like to be a bat?" That is fine if your readers are familiar with the subject. But if you cannot reasonably expect your intended audience to pick up on such things, you should explain what they mean.]
Searle, John R. Intentionality, an essay in the philosophy of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
In previous books (Speech Acts  and Expression and Meaning ), Searle introduced the ideas behind speech acts and started to extend them to ‘intentionality’, by which he means the property of certain states of mind in virtue of which they are directed towards objects or states of affairs in the world. In this book, he extends that work to philosophy of mind. Searle rejects a simple physicalistic or linguistic picture of the mind. He locates intentional states within a network, and against a background of non-intentional states. In the course of expounding his general theory of their nature, he is led to give his own accounts of perception, action, causation, conventional linguistic meaning, indexicals and proper names. Searle thinks of himself as swimming against the current, and much of his argument is negative. Nevertheless the gist is everywhere positive: his book is full of novel suggestions in familiar areas, and all the commitments are clearly spelled out. This book will extend our ability to make sense of intentional states and will, it is to be hoped, render out-of-date some still-held theories about the mind. This very clearly written book can be read with profit by philosophers and their students, both undergraduate and graduate level.
[Note: in addition to outlining the content of the book itself and providing a general evaluation, it places the book in the context of Searle's other work and of the field in general. It does not, but could, include a more specific list and evaluation of Searle's conclusions in the book, though that would make it long for an annotated bibliography.]